Distributed population dynamics: Optimization and control applications by Barreiro Gómez, Julián et al.
1Distributed Population Dynamics: Optimization and
Control Applications
J. Barreiro-Gomez, G. Obando, N. Quijano
Abstract—Population dynamics have been widely used in the
design of learning and control systems for networked engineering
applications, where the information dependency among elements
of the network has become a relevant issue. Classic population
dynamics (e.g., replicator, logit choice, Smith, and projection)
require full information to evolve to the solution (Nash equi-
librium). The main reason is that classic population dynamics
are deduced by assuming well–mixed populations, which limits
the applications where this theory can be implemented. In this
work, we extend the concept of population dynamics for non–
well–mixed populations in order to deal with distributed informa-
tion structures that are characterized by non–complete graphs.
Although the distributed population dynamics proposed in this
paper use partial information, they preserve similar character-
istics and properties of their classic counterpart. Specifically, we
prove mass conservation and convergence to Nash equilibrium.
To illustrate the performance of the proposed dynamics, we show
some applications in the solution of optimization problems, classic
games, and the design of distributed controllers.
I. INTRODUCTION
Population dynamics [1], [2], [3] describe the dynamical
process that a population experiences when there is a strategic
interaction among the agents that comprise the population.
The agents involved in this dynamical process evolve to an
equilibrium according to a revision protocol, which establishes
the individual decision rules that agents apply to choose the
best strategies (i.e., those strategies earning higher payoffs).
Population dynamics properties (e.g., passivity [4]) can be
exploited to design solutions for a variety of engineering
problems. For instance, designing of control and learning sys-
tems [5], [6], optimization [7], [8], coordination [9], dynamic
resource allocation [10], and so forth.
When using population dynamics for solving learning,
control, and optimization problems, some elements of the
problem are associated with “strategies” that agents in the
population can adopt, and other elements are associated with
“masses” of agents playing each strategy. This analogy has a
direct implication in the information required to implement a
solution based on a population dynamics algorithm, since the
existing algorithms assume that the population is well–mixed
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[1], [3] (i.e., any pair of agents playing any pair of strategies
can interact with each other). A consequence of the well–
mixed population structure assumption is that the elements
of the problem are allowed to interact each other without
any constraint (i.e., following a full–information structure).
Therefore, classic population dynamics are restricted to be
implemented in problems characterized by a centralized infor-
mation scheme. However, the number of problems that require
distributed solutions has increased dramatically in the last few
years. In this regard, some approaches have been proposed to
model the interaction constraints in a population of players.
For instance, the authors in [11], [12] deal with normal–form
games and propose a graph–based interaction model, where
each node in the graph represents an individual that repetitively
plays a symmetric game with its neighbors. However, this
approach is not suitable to be applied in the population game
framework since, in this framework, it is preferable to avoid
the individuation of players [3]. On the other hand, other
approaches aim to apply learning algorithms that are capable
to deal with information constraints [13], [14]. Similarly, the
authors in [15] modify the well known replicator dynamics
model to relax the full–information dependency. They propose
a distributed replicator equation in which the evolution of
each strategy is only governed by the “neighboring” strategies
(according to a given topology).
This paper extends the results in [15]. Our main contribution
is the design of a general method that allows us to deduce
several distributed population dynamics. The core of the
proposed method is the use of the mean dynamics [3] in non–
well–mixed populations. To illustrate our methodology, we
present a distributed version of the fundamental population dy-
namics (those obtained by applying classic revision protocols),
i.e., the distributed replicator dynamics, the distributed Smith
dynamics, the distributed logit dynamics, and the distributed
projection dynamics. It is worth noting that the deduction
presented in this work can be used to generate other distributed
dynamics by using alternative revision protocols. Besides, we
show that a well–mixed population obeys a structure given by
a complete graph, whereas a non–well–mixed population has
many different possible structures that are generally given by
non–complete graphs. In this sense, the proposed approach is
versatile to be implemented in a large variety of problems with
different information structures. Moreover, we show that the
distributed population dynamics exhibit similar stability and
invariance properties as their classic counterpart. Finally, the
application of the deduced distributed population dynamics in
optimization problems, classic games, and controllers design
is highlighted.
2The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II presents some preliminary concepts related to population
games and graphs. Section III introduces the mean dynam-
ics in non–well–mixed populations. Section III-B shows the
deduction of distributed population dynamics from the mean
dynamics and several revision protocols. In Section IV-A, the
invariant set analysis corresponding to the population mass
constraint is presented. Section IV-B derives sufficient con-
ditions on the graph associated with the population structure
that guarantee the convergence of the distributed population
dynamics to a Nash equilibrium. Section V presents some
examples that illustrate the application of the proposed dy-
namics in: i) distributed optimization, ii) classic games, and iii)
design of distributed controllers. Finally, results are discussed
in Section VI, and concluding remarks are drawn in Section
VII.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Graphs
We use graph–theoretical tools to describe the constraints
on the interactions among agents according to the population
type, i.e., well–mixed or non–well–mixed. In this regard, let
G = (V, E ,A) be a weighted graph, where V = {1, . . . , n} is
the set of nodes representing the strategies in the population;
E ⊂ {(i, j) : i, j ∈ V} is the set of links representing possible
interaction among agents playing different strategies; and A =
[aij ] is an n × n weighted adjacency matrix whose elements
satisfy the following property: aij > 0 if (i, j) ∈ E , aij = 0
otherwise. Furthermore, the set of neighbors of a node i ∈ V ,
which is denoted by Ni, is defined as Ni = {j : (i, j) ∈ E}.
B. Population Games
Consider a population of mass m > 0 comprised of a
finite and large number of agents in a strategic interaction.
Throughout this paper, we assume without loss of generality,
that the mass of the population is equal to one, i.e., m = 1. As
was stated before, the set of available strategies for the agents
is given by V = {1, ..., n}. The scalar xi ≥ 0 represents
the fraction of the population mass that corresponds to the
agents choosing the strategy i ∈ V . The vector x ∈ Rn+ is
the state of the population with dimension n whose entries
are nonnegative real numbers. Similarly, x ∈ Rn++ denotes a
vector of dimension n with strictly positive entries. The set
of possible states of the population, which corresponds to all
possible distributions of agents among the strategies, is given
by the following simplex:
∆ =
{
x ∈ Rn+ :
∑
i∈V
xi = 1
}
. (1)
Agents playing the ith strategy obtain a reward given by a
fitness function fi(x), i.e., fi : ∆ → R is a continuous map
that specifies the payoff associated with the strategy i ∈ V .
Notice that a population game is completely characterized
by the fitness vector F (x) = [f1(x), . . . , fn(x)]>. There are
several types of games depending on F (x). Below, we present
the definition of two of them, which are found in a large
number of applications [16].
Definition 1. Let F : Rn+ 7→ Rn be a population game
with payoffs defined on the positive orthant. If there exists
a continuously differentiable potential function V : Rn+ 7→ R
that satisfies ∇V (x) = F (x), for all x ∈ Rn+, then F is a full
potential game.
Definition 2. The population game F : ∆ 7→ Rn is a stable
game if: (y − x)> (F (y)− F (x)) ≤ 0, for all x, y ∈ ∆.
The next theorem, adapted from [3], gives an equivalent
characterization of a stable game in terms of the Jacobian
matrix of F (x), i.e., DF (x); and the tangent space of the
simplex ∆.
Theorem 1. Let the population game F : ∆ 7→ Rn be
continuously differentiable. F is a stable game if and only
if ξ>DF (x)ξ ≤ 0, for all ξ ∈ T∆, x ∈ ∆, where T∆
is the tangent space of the simplex ∆, which is defined by
T∆ = {z ∈ Rn : ∑i∈V zi = 0}.
A population game combined with a revision protocol lead
to the emergence of population dynamics [3]. The function
ρ : Rn ×∆ → Rn×n+ is known as the revision protocol, and
describes the timing and the result of the decisions of agents
in the strategic interaction. The revision protocol takes the
payoff vector F (x) and a determined population state x ∈ ∆,
returning a non–negative matrix, whose element of the ith
row and jth column ρij(F (x), x) represents the conditional
switch rate from strategy i to strategy j, where i, j ∈ V .
Depending on the revision protocol used by the individuals,
we can find several kinds of population dynamics (see Table
I), e.g., replicator dynamics, Smith dynamics, logit dynamics,
projection dynamics, etc.
Table I
SOME REVISION PROTOCOLS AND THEIR CORRESPONDING POPULATION
DYNAMICS [3].
Revision protocol Population dynamics
PPIP: ρij = xj [fj − fi]+ Replicator dynamics
PCP: ρij = [fj − fi]+ Smith dynamics
LCP: ρij = e
η−1fj∑
k∈V
eη
−1fk
, η > 0 Logit dynamics
MPCP: ρij =
[fj−fi]+
xi
Projection dynamics
[·]+ := max(·, 0)
PPIP: Pairwise proportional imitation protocol, PCP: Pairwise comparison protocol,
LCP: Logit choice protocol, MPCP: Modified pairwise comparison.
In order to simplify the notation for fitness functions, and
revision protocols, we remove their corresponding arguments
from now on, i.e, fi = fi(x), and ρij = ρij(F (x), x).
III. GENERAL DYNAMICS ON GRAPHS
The dynamics describing a population behavior depend
on the population structure. In this regard, current literature
assumes that the population under consideration is well–
mixed, i.e., if we take any portion of the entire population, this
contains all the strategies with the same probability. Figure 1a
illustrates this fact by showing a population composed by a
large and finite number of agents involved in a game. Each
element in the figure represents an agent, and the shape of the
3element (“circle”, “square”, or “triangle”) denotes the strategy
that the agent has adopted. In population games, all agents
have the same probability to receive a revision opportunity.
The agent receiving the revision opportunity randomly choose
another agent from its neighbors and can change its own
strategy by the neighbor’s strategy depending on the selected
revision protocol. Since the population is well–mixed, the
probability that the selected opponent is playing any of the
available strategies is the same.
On the other hand, there could be a non–well–mixed popu-
lation as the one shown in Figure 1b. For this population, all
agents have the same probability to receive an opportunity to
make a revision. However, the probability that the opponent
is playing a particular strategy is not equal (e.g., if the
strategy played by the agent receiving the revision opportunity
is “square”, then there is the same probability to select an
opponent playing strategy “triangle” or “square”; but the
probability to select an opponent playing strategy “circle” is
zero since the population structure does not allow it).
a) b)
Figure 1. a) Well–mixed population. b) Non–well–mixed population.
Interactions among agents playing different strategies can
be represented by a graph G = {V, E ,A}. The set of nodes V
is associated with the available strategies and the set of links E
is related to the encounter probability between strategies, i.e.,
there exists a link between two strategies if their encounter
probability is different from zero. Hence, the elements of the
corresponding adjacency matrix A = [aij ] are as follows:
aij = 1 denotes that strategies i and j can encounter each
other, while aij = 0 denotes that the population structure
makes impossible a matching between strategies i and j. Ac-
cording to this convention, the scenarios associated with well–
mixed and non–well–mixed populations can be represented by
two kinds of graphs. The well–mixed population case is always
represented by a complete graph, whereas a non–well–mixed
population is represented by a graph with a specific topology
depending on the particular population structure (see Figure
2). In this paper, we assume that the encounter probability
between strategies i and j is the same as the one of strategies
j and i, i.e., the graph G is undirected.
1
2 3
1 2 3
a) b)
Figure 2. Graph representation of: a) The well–mixed population in Figure 1a.
b) The non–well–mixed population in Figure 1b. Nodes 1,2, and 3 correspond,
respectively, to strategies “circle”, “triangle”, and “square” of the proposed
example.
A. Mean Dynamics
Taking into account the previously discussed considerations,
this section formally describes the evolutionary process of
a non–well–mixed population involved in a strategic game.
Suppose that the population is composed by M agents, and
each of them receives a revision opportunity that is given by
an exponential distribution with rate R. Hence, during a time
dt, the revision opportunity received by each agent is given
by Rdt. Since we assume that the mass of the population is
equal to one, the scalar xi is equal to the portion of agents
playing the ith strategy, and Mxi is the total amount of agents
playing strategy i ∈ V . Consequently, the expected number
of revision opportunities received by agents playing the ith
strategy is approximately MxiRdt during dt (notice that xi
may vary during dt; however, this variation is negligible if
dt is small). Agents playing i ∈ V switch to strategy j ∈ V
with a probability that depends on the revision protocol, the
probability distribution of receiving a revision opportunity, and
the encounter probability between strategies i and j (given by
the population structure, which is represented by the graph
G), i.e., aijρij/R. Finally, the expected number of agents
switching from strategy i ∈ V to strategy j ∈ V during time
dt is Mxiaijρijdt.
Now, if we consider all possible strategies in the popu-
lation, the expected number of agents switching to strategy
i ∈ V is given by M∑j∈V xjajiρjidt, and the expected
number of agents playing strategy i ∈ V changing to other
strategies is given by Mxi
∑
j∈V aijρijdt. Therefore, the
variation of the proportion of agents playing the ith strategy is
deduced by a mass balance as follows x˙i =
∑
j∈V xjajiρji−
xi
∑
j∈V aijρij . This equation corresponds to the Distributed
Mean Dynamics, or mean dynamics for non–well–mixed pop-
ulations. Since G is undirected, notice that the distributed mean
dynamics can be rewritten as follows,
x˙i =
∑
j∈Ni
xjρji − xi
∑
j∈Ni
ρij . (2)
For complete graphs, i.e., for well–mixed–populations, we
have that Ni = V , obtaining the classic Mean Dynamics [3].
B. Distributed Population Dynamics
Distributed mean dynamics allow the inference of popu-
lation dynamics involving non–well–mixed populations com-
prised of agents that are programmed with a specific revision
protocol. This section shows the deduction of different dis-
tributed population dynamics using (2). The deduced dynamics
are named after the classic population dynamics that are
generated with the corresponding revision protocol.
1) Distributed Replicator Dynamics (DRD): The dis-
tributed replicator dynamics are obtained from the distributed
mean dynamics using the pairwise proportional imitation
protocol (Table I), as follows,
x˙i =
∑
j∈Ni
xjxi[fi − fj ]+ − xi
∑
j∈Ni
xj [fj − fi]+
=
∑
j∈Ni
xjxi(fi − fj).
4Finally, the distributed replicator dynamics are given by,
x˙i = xi
fi ∑
j∈Ni
xj −
∑
j∈Ni
xjfj
 . (3)
2) Distributed Smith Dynamics (DSD): In this case, we use
the pairwise comparison protocol (Table I). Substituting this
revision protocol in (2), we get
x˙i =
∑
j∈Ni
xj [fi − fj ]+ − xi
∑
j∈Ni
[fj − fi]+. (4)
Notice that (4) can be written as,
x˙i =
∑
j∈Ni
1
2
(
(1− φij)xi + (1 + φij)xj
)
[fi − fj ],
where φij = sgn(fi − fj).
3) Distributed Logit Dynamics (DLD): The deduction of
the distributed logit dynamics is based on the logit choice
protocol (Table I). However, notice that this protocol requires
full information since the sum at the denominator is taken over
all the strategies. In order to satisfy the information constraint
given by the graph G, we modify the protocol as follows,
ρij(F, x) = e
η−1fj , η > 0.
Distributed logit dynamics are obtained by replacing the
above protocol in the distributed mean dynamics, i.e.,
x˙i =
∑
j∈Ni
xje
η−1fi − xi
∑
j∈Ni
eη
−1fj . (5)
4) Distributed Projection Dynamics (DPD): The projection
dynamics use the modified pairwise comparison protocol, i.e.,
x˙i =
∑
j∈Ni
xj
[fi − fj ]+
xj
− xi
∑
j∈Ni
[fj − fi]+
xi
,
=
∑
j∈Ni
(fi − fj) .
Thus, the distributed projection dynamics are given by
x˙i = |Ni|fi −
∑
j∈Ni
fj , (6)
where |Ni| denotes the cardinality of the set Ni, i.e., the
number of neighbors of the ith node.
IV. INVARIANT SET AND STABILITY ANALYSIS
A. Invariant Set Analysis
As was mentioned in Section II, the population mass does
not vary over time. Hence, all possible states generated during
the evolution of the population should belong to the simplex
∆ given in (1). This section shows that the simplex ∆ is
an invariant set under the distributed population dynamics
deduced in the previous section.
Theorem 2. The simplex ∆ is an invariant set under: the
distributed replicator dynamics (3), the distributed Smith dy-
namics (4), and the distributed logit dynamics (5).
Proof. According to Equation (1), ∆ has to conditions: i)∑
i∈V xi = 1 (mass conservation); ii) xi ≥ 0, for all i ∈ V
(non–negativeness).
First, we prove that DRD, DSD, and DLD satisfy condition
i). Notice that this is equivalent to show that
∑
i∈V x˙i = 0
under the distributed mean dynamics (2). These dynamics can
be written by using the adjacency matrix of the graph G as
follows
x˙i =
∑
j∈V
aijρjixj −
∑
j∈V
aijρijxi.
Hence, ∑
i∈V
x˙i =
∑
i∈V
∑
j∈V
aijρjixj −
∑
i∈V
∑
j∈V
aijρijxi.
Since G is undirected (i.e., aij = aji), we have∑
i∈V
x˙i =
∑
i∈V
∑
j∈V
ajiρjixj −
∑
j∈V
∑
i∈V
ajiρjixj
= 0.
Second, we prove that each dynamic satisfies condition ii):
• DRD: Non–negativeness of each xi is satisfied given the
fact that x˙i = 0 if xi = 0 under distributed replicator
dynamics. Thus, if xi(0) ≥ 0, then xi(t) ≥ 0 for all
t ≥ 0.
• DSD: According to (4), notice that when xi = 0 for any
i ∈ V , then x˙i ≥ 0. Hence, the non–negativeness of xi is
satisfied under distributed Smith dynamics.
• DLD: Notice that x˙i ≥ 0 when xi = 0 under distributed
logit dynamics (5). Therefore, if x(0) ∈ ∆, then xi(t) ≥
0 for all t ≥ 0.
Proposition 1. The set ∆′ = {x ∈ Rn : ∑i∈V xi = 1} is
invariant under the distributed projection dynamics (6).
Proof. The distributed projection dynamics can be written by
using the adjacency matrix of the graph G as follows
x˙i =
∑
j∈V
aijfi −
∑
j∈V
aijfj .
Therefore, ∑
i∈V
x˙i =
∑
i∈V
∑
j∈V
aijfi −
∑
i∈V
∑
j∈V
aijfj .
Since aij = aji because G is undirected, we obtain∑
i∈V
x˙i =
∑
j∈V
∑
i∈V
ajifi −
∑
i∈V
∑
j∈V
aijfj
=0.
Remark 1. It should be noticed that the distributed projection
dynamics satisfy one of the conditions of the original simplex
∆, i.e.,
∑
i∈V xi = 1 (mass conservation). However, the non–
negativeness of xi is not guaranteed. This fact also occurs in
the classic projection dynamics. ♦
Remark 2. Notice that Theorem 2 and Proposition 1 do
not impose any conditions on the interaction graph G. Thus,
the studied distributed population dynamics exhibit simplex
invariance under any population structure. ♦
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Classic population dynamics usually converge to Nash equi-
libria since Nash equilibria correspond to the expected out-
come of games played by rational individuals (i.e., individuals
that are trying to maximize their profit). Given a population
game F , the set of Nash equilibria is defined as follows [3],
NE(F ) = {x∗ ∈ ∆ : x∗i > 0⇒ fi(x∗) ≥ fj(x∗), ∀i, j ∈ V}.
Thus, in a Nash equilibrium, all players perceives the same
profit.
This section provides sufficient conditions guaranteeing that
a Nash equilibrium x∗ of the population game F is asymptoti-
cally stable under the distributed population dynamics derived
in Section III-B. These conditions, which are related to the
connectivity of the interaction graph and the characteristics
of the Nash equilibrium, are summarized in the following
assumptions.
Assumption 1. The graph G that describes the population
structure is connected.
Assumption 2. The Nash equilibrium x∗ belongs to the
interior of the simplex ∆, i.e., x∗ ∈ int∆, where
int∆ =
{
x ∈ Rn++ :
∑
i∈V xi = 1
}
.
Below, we provide our results on convergence of the dis-
tributed population dynamics to a Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 3. Let F be a full potential game with strictly
concave potential function V (x), and let x∗ ∈ NE(F ). If
Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, then x∗ is asymptotically stable un-
der the distributed replicator dynamics (3) and the distributed
Smith dynamics (4).
Proof. Since x∗ ∈ NE(F ) and x∗ ∈ int∆, we conclude
that fi(x∗) = fj(x∗), for all i, j ∈ V . Moreover, notice that
x∗ = arg maxx∈∆ V (x) (applying the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker
conditions). Additionally, since V (x) is strictly concave, we
can take EV (x) = V (x∗) − V (x) as a Lyapunov function
candidate. The derivative of EV (x) along the trajectories of
DRD (3) and DSD (4) is given by
E˙V (x) = −(∇V (x))>x˙
= −F>x˙
= −F>L(x)F,
where L(x) =
[
l
(x)
ij
]
is a matrix whose entries l(x)ij are for
DRD as follows:
l
(x)
ij =

−aijxixj , if i 6= j∑
k∈V,k 6=i
aikxixk, if i = j,
and for DSD:
l
(x)
ij =

−aij
2
(
(1− φij)xi + (1 + φij)xj
)
, if i 6= j
∑
k∈V,k 6=i
aik
2
(
(1− φik)xi + (1 + φik)xk
)
, if i = j.
Notice that L(x) is the Laplacian of the undirected graph
given by the tuple G(x) = (V, E ,A(x)), where A(x) =
[a
(x)
ij ] is the adjacency matrix whose entries are defined
as follows: a(x)ij = aijxixj , for DRD; and a
(x)
ij =
aij
2 ((1− φij)xi + (1 + φij)xj), for DSD. These entries are
nonnegative since x ∈ ∆. Thus, L(x) ≥ 0 and E˙V (x) ≤ 0.
Therefore, x∗ is stable under DRD and DSD.
Considering that x∗ ∈ int∆ is stable, a set B around x∗ can
be defined such that if x(0) ∈ B, then x(t) ∈ int∆, for all
t ≥ 0 (it is possible to show that B = int∆ for DRD). Thus,
if x(0) ∈ B, the null space of L(x) is equal to span{1}
(we use 1 to denote a vector of dimension n whose entries
are all 1) since G(x) is connected (we conclude that G(x) is
connected since: i) G(x) and G have the same topology in B,
i.e., if x ∈ B, a(x)ij = 0 only if aij = 0; ii) G is connected by
assumption). In this case, E˙V (x) = 0 if and only if fi = fj ,
for all i, j ∈ V , i.e., E˙V (x) = 0 only in x∗. Therefore, x∗ is
asymptotically stable.
Remark 3. Theorem 3 requires that, in steady state, all
strategies are played by the individuals involved in the game.
Indeed, when any proportion of individuals is extinct at
equilibrium (i.e., x∗i = 0 for some i ∈ V), then convergence of
the distributed replicator equation and the distributed Smith
dynamics to the Nash equilibrium is not guaranteed. However,
the same arguments used in [15] can be employed to relax the
convergence conditions. In fact, if subtracting from the original
graph any set of nodes associated to extinct strategies does not
produce disconnected subgraphs, then convergence to Nash
equilibria is provable even if Nash equilibria do not belong
to the interior of ∆. This relaxed assumption often holds in
well–connected graphs. ♦
Remark 4. Notice that Theorem 3 is only applicable to full
potential games. However, this class of games arises in a large
number of applications including resource allocation problems
and congestion games [3]. ♦
Theorem 4. Let F be a continuously differentiable stable
game, let x∗ ∈ NE(F ), and let x˙ be the distributed projection
dynamics (6). If Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, then x∗ is
asymptotically stable.
Proof. Consider the pairwise comparison protocol
ρij = [fj − fi]+, and define ρij = ϕ(fj − fi), where
ϕ(·) = [·]+. Then, consider the Lyapunov function candidate:
V (x) =
∑
i∈V
∑
j∈V
aij
∫ fj−fi
0
ϕ(s)ds.
Since ϕ : R 7→ R+ is increasing on [0,+∞) and G is con-
nected, the function V (x) > 0, for all x 6= x∗. Additionally,
V (x∗) = 0 since fj(x∗) = fi(x∗), for all i, j ∈ V . Moreover,
notice that
∂V (x)
∂xl
=
∑
i∈V
∑
j∈V
aij
(
∂fj
∂xl
− ∂fi
∂xl
)
ϕ(fj − fi)
=
∑
i∈V
∑
j∈V
aijϕ(fj − fi)∂fj
∂xl
−
∑
j∈V
∑
i∈V
ajiϕ(fi − fj)∂fj
∂xl
.
6Taking into account that aij = aji, we obtain
∂V (x)
∂xl
=
∑
i∈V
∑
j∈V
aji(fj − fi)∂fj
∂xl
=
∑
j∈V
∂fj
∂xl
∑
i∈Nj
(fj − fi).
According to (6), notice that
∑
i∈Nj
(fj − fi) = x˙j , where x˙j
is the jth element of the distributed projection dynamics x˙.
Hence,
∂V (x)
∂xl
=
∑
j∈V
x˙j
∂fj
∂xl
. (7)
Therefore, the time derivative of the Lyapunov function is
V˙ (x) = (∇V (x))> x˙
= x˙>DF (x)x˙,
where x˙>DF (x)x˙ ≤ 0 since F is stable.
Remark 5. As was stated in the proof of Theorem 3, the fact
that a Nash equilibrium x∗ belongs to int∆ implies that all the
fitness functions reach the same value, i.e., fi(x∗) = fj(x∗),
for all i, j ∈ V . Therefore, the results given in Theorems 3 and
4 are related to the contributions reported in the literature on
consensus in multi–agent networks (e.g., see [17], [18], [19]).
An essential difference is that Theorems 3 and 4 show a direct
relationship between game–theoretic properties and Lyapunov
stability of a population game under distributed dynamics. ♦
The connectivity condition of the graph G in Theorems 3
and 4 is sufficient for Nash equilibrium stability. Regarding
this fact, it is interesting to study if this condition is also
necessary. The following proposition gives us insights on this
issue.
Proposition 2. Assume that the population game F has a
unique Nash equilibrium, which is in the interior of the simplex
∆, i.e., x∗ ∈ int∆. Let x˙ be the distributed mean dynamics (2).
If x(t) asymptotically converges to x∗, for all x(0) ∈ int∆,
then the graph G is connected.
Proof. We prove the contrapositive. Assume that G is non-
connected. We can express G as the union of r ≥ 2 connected
components (maximal connected sub-graphs) denoted by Gp =
(Vp, Ep), where p = 1, . . . , r, i.e., G = ⋃rp=1 Gp. We use the
arguments in the proof of Theorem 2 to conclude that, under
the distributed mean dynamics,
∑
i∈Vp xi(t) =
∑
i∈Vp xi(0),
for all p = 1, . . . , r, and for all t ≥ 0. Take two connected
components G1 and G2 of the graph G. Furthermore, take the
following initial condition:
xi(0) =

x∗i +
ε
|V1| if i ∈ V1
x∗i − ε|V2| if i ∈ V2
x∗i otherwise
where i ∈ V , and ε > 0. Notice that, for small values of ε,
x(0) ∈ int∆ since x∗ ∈ int∆. Under this initial condition, it
is not possible that x(t) converges to the unique Nash equilib-
rium x∗ since
∑
i∈V1 xi(t) =
∑
i∈V1 xi(0) >
∑
i∈V1 x
∗
i , for
all t ≥ 0.
Therefore, if we need to guarantee convergence to the Nash
equilibrium from any initial condition inside the simplex ∆,
we require that the graph G is connected. However, this
condition might not be necessary if the initial conditions
x(0) are constrained. For instance, suppose that the graph
G in the population game is non-connected. Moreover, G is
composed of r connected components (maximal connected
sub-graphs) denoted by Gp = (Vp, Ep), where p = 1, . . . , r,
i.e., G = ⋃rp=1 Gp. Then, it can be shown (following the same
reasoning as in proof of Proposition 2) that the equilibrium
point x∗ ∈ int∆ is asymptotically stable if ∑i∈Vp x∗i =∑
i∈Vp xi(0) for all p = 1, . . . , r. Consequently, in this case,
the connectivity condition of G is not necessary.
V. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES
Recently, game–theory–based techniques have received
widespread attention from the engineering community, espe-
cially for addressing optimization and control problems. This
fact has been mainly motivated by three reasons: i) Many
engineering problems can be formulated as strategic games.
Indeed, the analogy between problems’ components (such as
objectives, decision makers, control actions, etc.) and games’
components (payoff functions, players, and strategies) is natu-
ral in several cases (e.g., see [20], [21]). In this regard, thinking
of an engineering problem as a game is often useful to devise
solution methods. ii) The rational outputs of games, i.e., Nash
equilibria, provide proper solutions of engineering problems.
In fact, there has been shown that, in some applications, there
exists a complete equivalence between the optimal solution
of the addressed problem and the Nash equilibrium of the
underlying game [3] (a specific case for which this property
holds is in potential games). iii) Solution of games can be
obtained by employing local information [22], [23]. Therefore,
if a game framework is applied to address an engineering
problem, distributed methodologies emerge.
Among the reasons described above, the last one is of
special interest in current applications. This fact is because
the rapid growth of systems in complexity and scale makes
centralized approaches unsuitable. Hence, distributed tech-
niques are becoming more prevalent nowadays. This section is
devoted to propose distributed solutions from the perspective
of population games. It is worth noting that classic population
games (which requires centralized information) have been
applied to solve a large number of engineering problems.
For instance, access control in communication networks [9],
combinatorial optimization [24], bandwidth allocation [25],
hierarchical frequency control in microgrids [26], dispatch
of electric generators [27], building temperature control [10],
constrained extremum seeking [28], control of drinking water
networks [29], and so forth. The same applications can be
addressed with the approach developed in this paper, i.e.,
by using distributed population dynamics. This approach has
some benefits related to the information privacy, resilience
to central failures, and parallelization of the computations.
In order to show the versatility of the distributed population
dynamics, three application examples are presented corre-
sponding to the following key areas: distributed optimization,
classic games, and distributed control design.
7A. Solving a Distributed Optimization Problem
First, we propose the following distributed optimization
problem,
max V (x) := −x>x+ b>x
s.t.
50∑
i=1
xi = 1, and xi > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , 50, (8)
where x ∈ R50 is the vector of decision variables, and
b ∈ R50 is a vector of constants, whose entries are given
by bi = 2i1275 , i.e., b =
1
1275 [2 4 ... 100]
>. Each decision
variable is managed by a node in a network. Furthermore, we
impose an information constraint given by the graph shown
in Figure 3. This graph is obtained by following the Erdo¨s–
Re´nyi model (which is the simplest model of several kind
of social and biological networks [30]) with edge generation
probability equal to 0.01. Besides, we add a path connecting
all nodes to guarantee that the generated graph is connected.
The information constraint implies that the ith node only
has information about the state of its neighbors. In order to
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Figure 3. Non–complete graph for the distributed optimization example.
solve the problem in (8), we define a full potential game
F =
[
∂V
∂x1
, . . . , ∂V∂x50
]>
(i.e., the fitness functions correspond
to the marginal utilities) and apply the distributed population
dynamics derived in Section III-B. Notice that all nodes
satisfy the information constraint (this fact is not possible by
using the classic population dynamics). Results are shown in
Figure 4 considering an initial condition xi(0) = 150 , for all
i = 1, . . . , 50. First and fourth row of Figure 4 show that x(t)
satisfies the problem constraints for all time, i.e., xi(t) remains
nonnegative, for all i = 1, . . . , 50; and
∑50
i=1 xi(t) = 1.
Furthermore, third row of Figure 4 shows that all distributed
dynamics increase the objective function V (x). However, only
DRD, DSD, and DPD reach the optimum value (which are
depicted in dashed red line). According to the second row of
Figure 4, DRD, DSD, and DPD equalize the fitness functions’
values in steady state, i.e., these dynamics converge to a Nash
equilibrium. This behavior is consistent with the results stated
in Theorems 3 and 4 since V (x) corresponds to a strictly
concave potential function, i.e., F is a full potential and stable
game. Moreover, convergence time varies from one dynamic
to another. DLD shows the fastest time response while the
convergence of DRD is the slowest.
The academical example proposed in Equation (8) can
be adapted to model practical optimization problems. For
instance, let us consider the economic dispatch of distributed
generators reported in [15]. This problem is stated as follows:
consider a set of n generators that are connected to the electric
distribution network. These generators have to supply a certain
load denoted by L. Therefore,
∑n
i=1 pi = L, where pi ≥ 0 is
the power supplied by the ith generator. The cost of production
of pi is given by a quadratic function ci(pi) = αi+βipi+γip2i ,
where αi, βi, γ > 0 are parameters associated with the i-th
generator. The goal of the economic dispatch problem is to
minimize the total cost of energy production, which is given by
J(p1, . . . , pn) :=
∑n
i=1 ci(pi). Mathematically, this problem
is formulated as follows:
min J(p1, . . . , pn) :=
n∑
i=1
αi + βipi + γip
2
i
s.t.
n∑
i=1
pi = L, and pi ≥ 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n. (9)
Notice that the formulation of problems (8) and (9) are similar.
Indeed, if we let the generators be the strategies of a game,
and the power supplied by the ith generator be the amount
of population playing the strategy i. Then, it is possible to
model the economic dispatch of distributed generators as a
population game, where the fitness functions are given by the
marginal cost of energy production, i.e., fi = ∂J∂pi , for all
i = 1, . . . , n. In this regard, we can address the economic
dispatch of distributed generators by using the same procedure
described in the solution of the optimization problem (8). This
approach is appealing, specially in scenarios where the number
of distributed generators is large.
B. Classic Population Games: Bad Rock–Paper–Scissors with
a Twin
To evaluate the behavior of a non–well mixed population
involved in a strategic interaction, we use a classic game
called “bad rock–paper–scissor with a twin” (adapted from
[3]). Moreover, we compare the performance of the distributed
dynamics proposed in Section III-B with their classic counter-
part (i.e., assuming a well–mixed population).
The bad rock–paper–scissor with a twin preserves the same
rules as the rock–paper–scissors game. The difference is that
the losing strategies have double penalty, i.e., this is not a
zero–sum game. Moreover, another strategy called “twin” is
added, which earns the same payoff as scissors. Summarizing,
this game can be represented by the following payoff matrix
A =

0 −2 1 1
1 0 −2 −2
−2 1 0 0
−2 1 0 0
 ,
where the first, second, third, and fourth column/row corre-
sponds to rock, paper, scissors, and twin, respectively. In this
case, the fitness functions are given by F (x) = Ax.
Evolution of the population state is shown in Figure 5 under
distributed (first row) and classic (second row) dynamics. For
the distributed case, we use a path graph. It can be noticed
a similar behavior between the trajectories obtained by using
the classic population dynamics and its distributed counterpart.
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Figure 4. Evolution under different distributed population dynamics: states (1st row), fitness functions (2nd row), objective function (3rd row), equality
constraint (4th row).
DSD, DRD, and DPD exhibit oscillations around the set of
Nash equilibria (depicted in red). Indeed, a limit cycle emerges
in each case. The main difference is that the limit cycle lies in
the plane orthogonal to the set of Nash equilibria for the classic
dynamics while it is not orthogonal for the distributed case.
Additionally, the angle formed by the plane containing the
limit cycle and the set of Nash equilibria is the same for DSD,
DRD, and DPD. On the other hand, both DLD and classic logit
dynamics reach the same equilibrium point. However, this rest
point does not belong to the set of Nash Equilibria. We notice
the fact that this characteristic has been reported before in the
literature related to classic logit dynamics (e.g., see [3]).
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Figure 5. Distributed (up) and classic (bottom) population dynamics applied
to bad rock(R)–paper(P)–scissors(S) with a twin(T).
C. Distributed Control of Dynamical Systems
Finally, we design a distributed controller for the optimal
transportation of drinking water1(relationship between dis-
tributed control and games has been pointed out in several
papers, e.g., [31], [32]). The system is composed by n coupled
tanks as shown in Figure 6. The arrows in the graphical
1Parameters of this academical problem have been scaled from real trans-
portation of drinking water problems.
representation show how flow directions are. Each tank has
an outflow given by an unknown demand considered as a
disturbance that is denoted by di, and an inflow ui from a
limited water source, i.e., the control outputs are subject to
a constraint given by
∑n
i=1 ui ≤ K, where K is the total
available resource. The mentioned inflows are controlled by
xi that determines a percentage of the total resource K, then
ui = Kxi, and
∑n
i=1 xi = 1. We assume that there are
local controllers at the valves to guarantee the desired inflow
according to the signal xi. The dynamics for this system are
h1
x1
h2
x2
hn
xn
· · ·
· · ·
h3
x3
h4
x4
Source
d1 d2 d3 d4 dn
Figure 6. Simple drinking water system with a unique resource and unknown
demands.
as follows,
dh1
dt
= u1 −
√
ρgh1 − d1
dhi
dt
= ui +
√
ρghi−1 −
√
ρghi − di, i = 2, ..., n− 1
dhn
dt
= un +
√
ρghn−1 − dn,
where hi is the water level of the ith tank, ρ is the density of
the fluid, and g is the gravity. The proposed example considers
the case of 4 tanks, and the control objective is to maintain the
water level of each tank at a safety value of reference, which
is given by the company in charge of the management of the
network. This safety value is obtained according to the demand
that each tank supplies. For this particular example the safety
reference is established at 0.5 m, and the unknown demand
9profile at each node during two days is shown in Figure 7
(adapted from [33]).
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Figure 7. Demand profile (d1, d2, d3 and d4) during 2 days for the 4 tanks
case.
To control this plant using population dynamics, we propose
the following analogy: the population is related to the available
water, the strategies correspond to the tanks. Therefore, the
population state x represents the distribution of the water
(in percentage) among the tanks. Additionally, the fitness
functions are selected to be the error at each tank, i.e.,
fi = 0.5 − hi, for all i = 1, . . . , n. Notice that this fitness
is appropriate since: i) more proportion of inflow is assigned
to those tanks with larger error, and ii) it is known that hi
increases as the inflow controlled by xi increases, i.e., the
fitness function fi is decreasing with respect to xi satisfying
the condition for a stable game [3]. Furthermore, consider the
case in which the quantity of water required to meet the safety
levels is less than the available resource. In this situation, if all
the available resource is allocated in the tanks, the safety levels
would be exceeded. Therefore, it is necessary to introduce an
additional strategy whose corresponding population xn+1 is
used as a slack variable. The fitness function for this slack
variable is fn+1 = 0. Hence, if the level in the ith tank is
higher than the safety level (i.e., fi < 0), it is more profitable
to allocate resource to the slack variable than to the ith tank.
Figure 8 shows the control performance considering full
information in the classic Smith dynamics, i.e., that at each
point of the network, the information related to all the system
is available to make decisions. Figure 9 shows the performance
of a distributed controller designed based on DSD. The infor-
mation graph considered for this example is a path graph,
i.e., that the ith tank only has information about the (i− 1)th
and the (i + 1)th tanks. First, notice that in this particular
problem with four control actions and one slack variable,
the classical Smith dynamics with full information require 10
communication links. In contrast, the distributed population
dynamics approach for a problem with four control actions,
one slack variable, and a path configuration just require four
communication links.
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Figure 8. System states evolution for a controller with full information.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
0
0.5
1
1.5
Tanks level
time [hours]
wa
te
r l
ev
el 
[m
]
 
 
Tank 1 Tank 2 Tank 3 Tank 4
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
0
1
2
3
Control signals
time [hours]
inf
low
s [
m
3 /s
]
 
 
Slack variable
Figure 9. System states evolution for a distributed population dynamics based
controller.
Regarding control performance, results show that the control
objective is achieved with both the Smith dynamics controller
with full information and with the DSD controller by using
partial information despite the hard and unknown outflow
disturbances at each tank. Furthermore, it can be noticed that
the settling time of the distributed controller is not far from
the one obtained with full information. Additionally, once the
system achieves the set–point, both controllers have similar
behavior showing the well performance of the distributed
population dynamics approach.
VI. DISCUSSION
This paper proposes a methodology to generate distributed
population dynamics from revision protocols considering dif-
ferent population structures. The core of the proposed method
lies in a generalization of the mean dynamics for non–well–
mixed populations. This novel concept provides us a tool
to deal with information constraints related to the strategic
interactions of the individuals that conform the population. Al-
lowed agents’ interactions within the population are described
by means of an undirected graph. Following this convention,
we have shown that well–mixed populations are characterized
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by complete graphs, while non–well–mixed populations are
represented by non–complete graphs. The main implication of
this feature is the possibility to derive population dynamics
that only use local information to evolve, i.e., distributed
population dynamics.
The appealing features of distributed population dynam-
ics have been exploited in some application examples that
illustrate their usefulness. We have shown that distributed
population dynamics can be used in the design of constrained
optimization algorithms, and the synthesis of control systems
for problems requiring non–centralized schemes. Compared
to other distributed techniques such as dual decomposition
methods [34], the implementation of distributed population
dynamics does not need the inclusion of a centralized coordi-
nator. This property is important because it reduces the cost
of the required communication infrastructure. Furthermore,
some families of distributed population dynamics (e.g., DRD,
DSD, and DLD) naturally address non–negativity constraints
(see Theorem 2) that emerges in a variety of problems due
to physical limitations. For instance, in scheduling problems,
the time allocated to each task cannot be negative. Although
non–negativity constraints are tackled in other distributed
approaches by means of barrier functions, it is known that
the use of barrier functions carries out some problems related
to the convergence rate and the accuracy of the solution,
especially for large–scale problems [35].
Different from population games, normal form games are
also employed in the literature to address engineering appli-
cations. Even though both frameworks are similar, they have
some important differences. For instance, in population games,
the players are characterized by a continuum of mass, while in
normal form games, each player is individually treated. This
difference makes population dynamics suitable to be applied in
problems that involve a large number of players that have the
same characteristics; for instance, in multiple access control
for communication systems [9]. On the other hand, It is worth
noting that most research effort has been devoted to study
distributed learning techniques in normal form games [36],
[23]. However, distributed methods for addressing population
games have been somewhat unexplored. In this regard, the re-
sults shown in this paper aim to motivate the use of population
dynamics in applications that require non–centralized schemes.
An important advantage of distributed population dynamics
compared to distributed learning algorithms for normal form
games has been pointed out in [37], where the author suggests
that classic learning techniques fail in applications that include
a coupled constraint that involves all the decision variables.
Under this scenario, distributed population dynamics become a
proper alternative since their trajectories evolve to the optimal
solution satisfying the coupled constraint associated to the
simplex ∆ as shown in Theorems 2–4.
This property can be exploited in resource allocation prob-
lems among a set of entities, which are given by the following
formulation:
max V (x)
s.t.
∑n
i=1 xi = X
xi ≥ 0, for all i = 1, . . . , n,
(10)
where xi is the resource allocated to the ith entity, X is the
available resource, and V (x) is a concave utility function. No-
tice that, distributed population dynamics can be used to solve
this problem in a distributed way (cf. Theorem 3). Indeed,
an advantage of population–dynamics–based techniques is that
they provide feasible solutions at any time of the optimization
process. This property makes distributed population dynamics
appropriate to be applied in online control schemes as in the
example of the optimal transportation of drinking water (c.f.
Section V-C). Moreover, from the proof of Theorem 3, we can
conclude that, in optimization problems described by potential
games (as is the case of the resource allocation problem
shown in Equation (10)), the associated utility function is
permanently increasing under distributed population dynamics.
Therefore, if the optimization process needs to be stopped
before obtaining the optimal solution, the founded solution
is at least suboptimal.
Simulations have illustrated the equivalence between the
steady state behavior of the proposed distributed dynamics and
classic population dynamics. Moreover, regarding the transient
performance, simulations have also shown that there exists a
relationship between the convergence rate and the algebraic
connectivity of the underlying communication graph. The
larger the algebraic connectivity is, the faster the transient
response of the corresponding dynamics. Indeed, the fastest
response is obtained by using a complete–graph, i.e., by using
classic population dynamics. Similarly to other distributed
schemes, the dependence of the performance on the graph
connectivity evidences a tradeoff between the number of
communication links and how fast the optimal solution is
reached.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We have generalized a methodology to generate distributed
population dynamics from the distributed mean dynamics and
different revision protocols. To illustrate the method, we have
derived four distributed population dynamics, i.e., the dis-
tributed Smith dynamics, the distributed replicator dynamics,
the distributed projection dynamics and the distributed logit
dynamics. We have proved that the distributed population
dynamics presented in this work exhibit mass conservation
and convergence to Nash equilibria in the same way as
classic population dynamics do. Finally, we have presented
some applications of the proposed dynamics in the design of
distributed optimization algorithms, solution of classic games,
and the synthesis of controllers for multi-variable system.
Simulation results have shown that distributed population
dynamics exhibit an appropriate performance and provide
optimal solutions despite the lack of full information. Thus,
distributed population dynamics are promising to address prob-
lems requiring non–centralized information structures. This
fact is relevant since distributed problems are becoming more
common in many fields, especially when large–scale and
complex systems are involved.
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